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Cooper: Fathers Are Parents Too: Challenging Safe Haven Laws with Procedu

NOTE
FATHERS ARE PARENTS TOO:
CHALLENGING SAFE HAVEN LAWS
WITH PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the country heard about the case of the teen couple who
left their live newborn baby in a hotel dumpster.' In 1998, Laura
Rafferty, gave birth to a baby in the shower at her sorority house and cut
its umbilical cord with scissors.! Afterwards, she wrapped the baby in a
towel and left it under her bed while she attended class.3 When she
returned, the baby was dead and she disposed of it in a nearby dumpster.4
In another case, Kelly Angell, described as an honor student, managed to
hide a full-term pregnancy from her family She delivered her son
within minutes in a heavily traveled airport restroom.6 She gave birth
while other women came in and out of stalls within inches of her, tried
to clean herself up, and then went to wait for her flight, leaving her baby
in the toilet bowl.7
These incidents have sparked a series of laws aimed at preventing
infanticide by allowing parents to leave their children at designated "safe
havens'8 within a short period after their birth. In return for safely
dropping off their infants, the safe haven laws guarantee anonymity and

1. See Jack Sullivan, Woman Accused of Killing Newborn at NDSU Sorority House Pleads
Guilty, FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), Apr. 28, 2000, at B I.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Margery Eagan, What to Make of Women Who Think a Baby is Disposable, BOSTON
HERALD, May 30, 2000, at 010.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. "Safe havens" include hospitals and other similar facilities such as fire, ambulance, and
police stations. See infra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
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immunity from prosecution for abandonment. 9 The ultimate goal of these
laws is to protect babies by persuading mothers to leave them in safe
places so they can receive any medical care that is needed and,
ultimately, be placed with an adoptive family. To date, forty-two states
have enacted such legislation." No court, however, has directly
addressed the implications of the non-relinquishing parents' parental
rights in relationship to the safe haven laws." It is unclear how the safe
haven laws constitutionally account for the fundamental rights of one
parent, the father, when the baby's mother abandons their child. This
Note will address this issue and focus on the constitutional rights of
fathers in the context of safe haven laws.
Part II addresses information regarding the safe haven laws. First,
the laws will be addressed generally, explaining what they are and why
they were enacted. Then a closer look will be taken at the specific
statutes and requirements in various states, and the similarities and
differences between them will be identified. Part III discusses the
fundamental rights of parents guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
and explains the rights afforded to nonconsenting parents, namely
fathers, when the baby's mother attempts to relinquish her rights to the
child. Supreme Court cases that deal with the rights of non-consenting
unwed fathers in adoption cases will be discussed. Part IV addresses
state cases where there is an interference with an unwed father's ability
to establish a relationship with his child and the effect this has on the
father's rights in adoption proceedings. Further, this part assesses how
state courts treat cases that have arisen from the safe haven laws. Part V
discusses the interaction between safe haven laws and procedural due
process concerns. Part VI will conclude that some of these safe haven
laws violate the fundamental rights of fathers.

9. See Michael S. Raum & Jeffrey L. Skaare, Encouraging Abandonment: The Trend
Towards Allowing Parents to Drop Off Unwanted Newborns, 76 N.D. L. REV. 511,513 (2000).
10. See Child Welfare League of Am., List of Enacted State Safe Haven Legislation at
http://www.cwla.org/programs/pregprev/flocrittsafehaven.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter Child Welfare League]. The following states have adopted Safe Haven legislation:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See id.
II. For purposes of this Note, the term non-relinquishing parent and father will be used to
mean the same thing. To date no father has challenged the constitutionality of the Safe Haven Laws.
There have been a few cases which have discussed in dicta the constitutionality of the Safe Haven
Laws. See infra Part IV.
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II.

SAFE HAVEN LAWS

Safe haven legislation is a national movement aimed at responding
to baby abandonment by enacting laws that provide parents with an
anonymous way to safely leave their babies in someone else's care
without the fear of being criminally prosecuted for abandonment. ' 2 The
first state to adopt this legislation was Texas which adopted its "Baby
Moses" law in June 1999.' 3 The Texas legislation was triggered by the
growing number of baby abandonments in the Houston area." In the first
ten months of 1999, thirteen babies were abandoned in Houston, three of
which were found dead. 5 Given the high rate of baby abandonment,
Texas leaders decided to take action. 6 Led by Texas State
Representative Geanie W. Morrison, 7 the safe haven legislation was
proposed to address two important issues. First, it was proposed to
significantly reduce the risk of a newborn being abandoned in a
dangerous environment that may result in death.'8 Second, the legislation
was proposed to protect mothers who feel as if they have no other option
besides abandonment, but who might be willing to safely deliver their
newborn to a safe haven.' 9 Accordingly, mothers who leave their babies
in a designated safe haven receive either immunity from prosecution or
an affirmative defense to child neglect and abandonment prosecution.' °
No two safe haven laws are exactly the same; however, all have
similar characteristics. Each state provides information as to where the
baby can be left, who may leave the child, and conditions under which

12. See Justin Unruh, Saving Abandoned Newborns: Frequently Asked Questions About the
Baby Moses Project, at http://www.babymoses.org/faq.htm. (last visited Jan. 12, 2001).
13. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 513; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.302,
262.303 (Vernon 2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 1(h) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
14. See Unruh, supra note 12.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Geanie W. Morrison is a Texas state Representative who is the author of the first bill to
address the increase in baby abandonment. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Child Welfare League, supra note 10. States which provide immunity from
prosecution include: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and
Wisconsin. See id. States which provide the safe haven statute as an affirmative defense include:
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas and West Virginia. See id. Missouri law provides for both an
affirmative defense and immunity from prosecution depending on the age of the baby when he is
left at the safe haven. See id.
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children may be left. Additionally, each law includes procedures which
must be followed when a designated safe haven accepts a child.
A.

Places a Baby Can Be Left

Generally, states include hospitals and other similar facilities in
their definition of a safe haven.2 For example, Indiana,22 Minnesota,23
South Carolina,24 Texas, 5 and West Virginia26 are among the states
which limit the definition of a safe haven. However, other states
expand the definition of a safe haven to include other locations, such as
fire, ambulance, and police stations." Some examples of states which
have adopted a broader definition of safe havens include Colorado,29
Delaware, ° Kansas,' Michigan,32 and Tennessee."

21. See id. The reason for using hospitals is that in an attempt to conceal the pregnancy:
[l]t appeared that the majority of these mothers had received no prenatal care, making
immediate medical attention critical .... [Ilt would appear that most mothers deliver
their babies in secret because they desire to keep the fact of the pregnancy confidential.
It is not unusual for babies delivered by mothers without assistance to develop various
kinds of distress .... For these reasons, the law is designed to encourage those who feel
they are forced or left no alternative but to abandon a baby rather than seek emergency
care from a health facility to go to those who are trained to stabilize and transport those
in need of immediate medical attention.
Unruh, supra note 12.
22. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(b) (West Supp. 2002) (calling for "emergency medical
services providers" to accept children).
23. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(a)(1) (West 2003) (stating that "lal hospital ... shall
receive a newborn left with a hospital employee").
24. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003) (authorizing drop-offs at "[a]
hospital or hospital outpatient facility operating in this State").
25. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §262.302(a) (Vernon 2002) (noting that "[a] designated
emergency infant care provider shall, without a court order, take possession of a child").
26. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie 2001) (allowing for children to be left at a
"hospital or health care facility").
27. This list does not include all the states which limit their definition of a safe haven, it only
provides some examples of states which do.
28. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 519.
29. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304.5(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (allowing
parents to leave children with firefighters at fire stations or a hospital staff member at a hospital).
30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907A (Supp. 2002) (allowing for abandonment at fire
stations and paramedic stations).
31. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-15,100 (2001) (designating as safe havens, in addition to fire
stations and hospitals, all city and county health departments).
32. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712.1-712.2 (West 2002) (allowing parents to leave
children at both fire and police stations in addition to emergency medical providers).
33. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-255 (2001) (calling for safety officers and "member[s] of
the professional medical community" to take children).
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B.

People Who Can Leave an Infant

A majority of states limit those eligible to leave a baby to the
child's parents.34 Examples of states in which this policy is followed
include, but are not limited to, Colorado,35 Florida,36 Oklahoma,37
Tennessee," and Texas.39 However, there are several states that allow
someone other than the parent to leave the child. Most of these states
require that anyone leaving the child besides the parent be acting on
behalf of the parent. Connecticut, ° Minnesota 4, South Carolina, and
California 43 are among these states. Delaware has the broadest
requirement, providing merely that "a person" can leave the child
without including any qualifying language." The anonymity which these
laws guarantee present problems. The person who is leaving the child
need not identify themselves or their relationship with the child. 4 This
leaves open the question of whether or not the person leaving the child
was lawfully entitled to possession of the child 46
C. What Children May Be Abandoned?
Newborns face two main limitations determining their eligibility
for being left at safe havens. The primary limitation imposed by all
states is an age limit.47 The other limitation, imposed by only a minority

34. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 521.
35. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304.5(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (allowing
parents to leave children).
36. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.50(2) (West 2002) (speaking in terms of a "parent" who
leaves a newborn infant).
37. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115.1(A) (West Supp. 2003) (exempting from criminal
liability any parent who complies with safe haven procedures).
38. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-255 (2001) (exempting from criminal liability any mother
who voluntarily delivers her unharmed infant to the appropriate facility).
.39. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302(a) (Vernon 2002).
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-58 (2001) (stating that a "parent or lawful agent of the
parent" can leave a child).
41. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(b) (West 2003) (guaranteeing that a hospital will not
inquire into the identity of the mother or person leaving the baby).
42. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (requiring hospitals to accept
newborns left with the hospital by "a person who does not express an intent to return for the infant"
but limiting immunity to parents and those acting at the direction of a parent).
43. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (West 2001) (referring to "a parent or other
person having lawful custody of the child").
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907A(b) (Supp. 2002).
45. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 523.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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of states, prohibits safe havens from accepting abused children. 4' The age
limitations range from state to state but most states impose a thirty day
limitation or a three day limitation (seventy-two hours) from birth.49
States which require a thirty day limitation include Connecticut, ° South
Carolina,5 and Tennessee.52 Other states such as California,53 Florida54
and Minnesota" impose a three day limitation. A person who leaves a
child older than the prescribed age limit may face prosecution for
abandonment. As a practical matter, the limits cannot be strictly
enforced and merely amount to approximations since the reporting
statutes anonymity clause provides that a parent/person need not state
the child's date of birth. Few of us could distinguish a thirty day old
child from a thirty-one day old.57
The other main prohibition amongst states dictates that the safe
havens not accept abused children." States that proscribe such
prohibitions such as Delaware,59 Florida 0 and Minnesota,6' all take the
same basic form. A safe haven will not accept a child if he or she shows
signs of abuse.62 If the child manifests signs of abuse, parents are subject
to prosecution.
D. Proceduresfor Accepting Children
A large component of safe haven legislation is the anonymity that it
guarantees. Virtually every safe haven law either expressly guarantees or
otherwise provides for the anonymity of the parents or person leaving
the child. Generally, these anonymity provisions come in three forms.63
States that fall into the first group do not explicitly provide for

48. See id. at 523-24.
49. See id. at 524.
50. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-58 (2001).
51. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
52. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-255(3) (2001).
53. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003).
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.50(l) (West 2002).
55. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(l)(a)(1) (West 2003).
56. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 525.
57. See id. Several states attempt to clear up the ambiguity. For example Florida requires that
a physician reasonably believe the child to be no more than three days old. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 383.50(l).
58. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 526.
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907A(b) (Supp. 2002).
60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.50(5).
61. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(a)(2) (West 2003).
62. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 526.
63. See id. at 527-28.
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anonymity; however, they also do not provide for identification of
parents.64 Since the statute does not mention parents after stating that
they are allowed to leave the children, it implies that the parents do not
need to be identified and can remain anonymous. Colorado, until
recently, was an example of a state in which the law is silent as to
identification." Additionally, Alabama,66 Texas67 and Louisiana 6
legislation are also silent on the subject of anonymity. These states allow
parents to leave children and do not mention the term "parents" again in
the statute.
The second group of laws expressly provide for anonymity but
place the burden of remaining anonymous on the parents. Safe havens,
such as those in California,69 Connecticut 0 and West Virginia,7'
accepting a child may ask questions of the person abandoning the child
but the person is not required to answer. In states such as New Jersey,72
Delaware73 and Oklahoma,74 anonymity is guaranteed by allowing
parents to remain anonymous but there are no express limitations on
what the safe haven may ask.
The final group affirmatively prevents safe havens accepting the
child from doing certain things or asking certain questions. Florida, 7
Wisconsin76 and Minnesota 77 are states which fall within this category.

64. See id. at 528.
65. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2000) (providing only that a parent may
leave child a without being prosecuted for abandonment, remaining silent as to identification).
66. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-25-1 to 26-25-5 (Supp. 2002).
67. See TEX. FAM. CODEANN. §§ 262.301-262.307 (Vernon 2002).
68. See LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1703-1706 (West Supp. 2002).
69. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (West 2001).
70. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-58(b) (West Supp. 2002) ("The designated employee
may request the parent or agent to provide the name of the parent or agent and information on the
medical history of the infant and parents. The parent or agent is not required to provide such name
or information.").
71. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie 2001) (providing that a hospital "may not
require the person to identify themselves, but shall otherwise respect the person's desire to remain
anonymous").
72. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4C-15.6 to 30:4C-15.9 (West Supp. 2002).
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907A (Supp. 2003).
74. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115.1 (West Supp. 2003) (providing anonymity for
someone leaving a newborn, but requiring him or her to state that he or she is the newborn's parent).
75. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.50(5) (West 2002) (providing that anyone
leaving a child "has
the absolute right to remain anonymous and to leave at any time and may not be pursued or
followed").
76. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.195(2) (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting the coercion of anyone
into revealing his or her name).
77. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902 (West Supp. 2002) (stating that "[t]he hospital must not
inquire as to the identity of the mother or the person leaving the newborn").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:877

There are also several states which have provisions that provide
parents with an opportunity to provide information. Under the provision
in South Carolina, parents are provided with forms giving them an
opportunity to provide information about the medical history of the
child.78 California and Michigan have similar provisions requiring the
person who accepts the child to attempt to discover certain information
such as medical history and the parents' identities.79
It is the anonymity requirement that creates a due process issue for
fathers. Since the babies are anonymously abandoned, it becomes
impossible to gather information regarding the identity of the father of
the child in order to provide him with notice proceedings regarding the
termination of his parental rights.
E. Proceduresfor Post-Abandonment
The details for the post-abandonment procedures vary from state to
state. However, most of the safe haven legislation contains two similar
requirements. First, the safe haven accepting custody of the child from a
parent is directed to "[p]erform any act necessary, in accordance with
generally accepted standards of professional practice, to protect,
preserve, or aid the physical health or safety of the child during the
temporary physical custody."80 California,8' Florida,82 Indiana, 3
Louisiana, 4 South Carolina, 5 Texas 6 and West Virginia 7 are examples
of states that provide for implicit consent by parents for necessary
treatment of the child. Other states, such as Connecticut 8 and
Minnesota, 89 do not contain any express provisions relating to the
treatment of the child. The second requirement, present in all states, is
that safe havens must contact the relevant state or county child welfare
agency and notify them that they have received a child.9° Although the
time frame for reporting is different among various states, reporting is
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002).
79. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 75.135(2)(a) (West 2002).
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304.5(2)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
81. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7(b) (West Supp. 2003).
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 383.50(3) (West 2002).
83. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(b) (West Supp. 2002).
84. See LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1704(A) (West Supp. 2003).
85. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002).
86. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302(c) (Vernon 2002).
87. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie 2001).
88. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-57-17a-61 (West 2001).
89. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(I) (West 2003).
90. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 533.
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mandatory.9 ' The relevant agency then takes physical custody of the
child, takes over the care of the child, and continues with the rest of the
prescribed process.92

Once the statute provides that the baby is turned over to a child
welfare agency, the safe haven laws are either silent about the
procedures for the adoption of the abandoned baby or they simply cross
reference the general provision of the particular state on the termination
of parental rights and adoption. 93 The general law, however, is not suited
to deal with specific issues that arise from the abandoned baby cases.
Most notably, there is no way to notify the father and obtain his consent
to termination of his parental rights.94
Il1.

RIGHTS OF NON-CONSENTING FATHERS IN THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES

The validity of the safe haven laws turns on father's rights
regarding notice of termination of parental rights proceedings. The
Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 95 The Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses a parent's liberty interest in the custody, care,
and control of their children.96 The Supreme Court has held that a
parent's right to make decisions concerning the custody, care, and
control of his or her children is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 97
Prior to 1972, an unwed father had no parental rights.98 To ensure
an adoption of a child, all that was needed was the consent of the child's
mother when the mother was not married. 99 If the father objected and
was not married to the mother, he had no legal standing to challenge the
adoption. 00 His consent was irrelevant. In 1972, this changed with the
Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois.'0 ' In Stanley, an Illinois

91. For example, Minnesota requires twenty-four hours. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.902(2).
92. See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 533.
93. See id.; see also Unruh, supra note 12.
94. See Joanna Grossman, The Adoptability of Abandoned Babies, Findlaw, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20011009.html. (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
98. See Note, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental
Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1972).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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statute that stated an unwed father was not fit to be a parent and that he
did not have a right to custody of any child was challenged. °2 Peter
Stanley lived with Joan Stanley intermittently for eighteen years during
which they had three children together but never married.0 3 When Joan
Stanley died, the children were declared wards of the state and placed
with court-appointed guardians.' °4 Stanley appealed, claiming that he
was deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 5 The Court concluded that as a matter of due
process, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children were taken away from him." By denying Stanley a
hearing, the state was denying him due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 For the first time, the Court recognized that
the right of unwed fathers to care for their biological children is entitled
to heightened constitutional protection against state interference.' 8 Thus,
after Stanley, fathers that have relationships with their children are
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before their parental
rights can be terminated.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,"9 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutional claims of an unwed father who had never lived with,
sought custody of, nor legitimated his child. Quilloin challenged a
statute that required nothing more than the mother's consent for the
adoption of an illegitimate child. The statute denied the father of an
illegitimate child any authority to block the adoption."0 Quilloin argdled
that this violated his due process and equal protection rights."' The
Court rejected Quilloin's challenge to the statute, holding that although
due process might require a state to obtain consent or establish unfitness
before acting to separate a "natural family," Quillion could make no
claim to being part of such a family Since he never sought custody of his
child."2 The Court focused not on biology but on the nature of the

102. See id. at 646 (noting that under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards
of the state upon the death of the mother).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 649.
107. See id.
108. See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless
Father,41 ARIz. L. REV. 753, 759 (1999).
109. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
110. See id. at 249-50.
111. See id. at 255-56.
112. See id. at 256.
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relationship with the child." 3 As a result, the rights of fathers' who have
never offered support or developed a relationship with their child are not
entitled to constitutional protection.
Following the Quillion case, the Court returned to the question of
an unwed father's constitutional right in Caban v. Mohammed."4 In
Caban, the Court held that a New York statute which mandated an
unmarried mother's consent, but not an unmarried father's consent, was
necessary for an adoption, violated the father's right of equal
protection." 5 Unlike the father in Quillion, Abdiel Caban lived with the
' 16
children's mother for several years and helped raise the children.
When the child's mother left, Abdiel continued to visit the children and
even took custody of them for several months. The Court concluded that
where a father has developed a substantial relationship with his children,
he could not have his rights terminated merely because he did not marry
the mother.' Therefore, a father who has developed a relationship with
his child is entitled to notice that his parental rights may be terminated.
After the Supreme Court's rulings in Quillion and Caban, it became
clear that unwed fathers could not be unconditionally excluded from the
adoption process, but neither were they positively entitled to insist that
adoption be conditioned upon their consent." 8 The constitutional rights
of unwed fathers to challenge the adoption of their children does not
arise from biological fatherhood alone, but rather from their having a
substantial relationship with their child worthy of protection." 9
This rule was further validated by the Supreme Court in Lehr v.
Robertson. 20 The Court analyzed a New York statute that required notice
to be given only to men who had been previously identified as, or
adjudicated to be, the child's father or had demonstrated an interest in
the child by filing a claim of possible paternity with the state's Putative
Father Registry. ' Lehr, an unwed father, challenged the adoption of his
two-year-old daughter because he had not been given prior notice.' 22 The
Supreme Court held that Lehr did not fall within any of the categories of
men who were entitled to notice because he had not developed a
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id.
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
See id. at 389.
See id.
See id. at 382-84.
See Meyer, supra note 108, at 762.
See id.
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
See id. at 251.
See id. at 250.
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substantial relationship with his child.'2 3 The Court distinguished
between fathers who have earned a right to be heard because they have
established a substantial relationship with their child and those who have
not earned rights because they have failed to establish a relationship.' 24
These Supreme Court adoption cases seem to recognize two
categories of fatherhood. One category involves the father who plays a
role in the life of his child by offering support and assuming
responsibility. This father is entitled to protection against interference
with the relationship and is therefore entitled to parental rights
comparable to that of the mother.'25 Absent this father's consent or a
showing of unfitness, his rights to his child could not be terminated. 2 6 In
contrast, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a biological father
who does not assume the duties of parenthood and who does not assert
his interest in fatherhood is deemed to have given up his parental
rights.'27
IV.

STATE COURTS' TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS' RIGHTS
REGARDING NEWBORN CHILDREN

Despite what appears to be decisive and all inclusive decisions, the
Court does not resolve what rights should be afforded to a father who is
unable to establish a relationship with his child for reasons outside of his
control. For example, the Court does not answer the question of what
rights a father has when his newborn child, with whom he is unable to
establish a relationship due to the short time frame, is put up for
adoption without his knowledge or consent.
In all of the cases decided by the Court, the unwed fathers knew of
the child's existence. In Stanley, the father had been living with the
children until the time they were removed from his custody.' 28 In
Quilloin, the very fact that Leon Quillion attempted to block his child's

123. See id. at 263-67.
124. See id. at 262. A substantial relationship includes establishing a custodial, personal or
financial relationship with the child. The Court stated that, "[i]f one parent has an established
custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a
relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents
different legal rights." Id. at 267-68 (footnote omitted).
125. See Meyer, supra note 108, at 762.
126. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); see also Caban v. Muhammed, 441 U.S.
380, 394 (1979).
127. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 259-60 (1983).
128. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
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adoption shows that he had knowledge of his child's existence.'29 In
Caban, the unwed father's contact and relationship with his children
were substantial. 3 Finally in Lehr, his visits to the child, his effort to
seek a paternity declaration and his attempt to block the child's adoption
are all evidence of the father's knowledge of his child's existence.' 3'
Furthermore, in the Supreme Court cases none of the children
involved were newborns. In Stanley, the children's ages are not
indicated, however, the Court's description of Stanley's interest being
that "of a man in the children he has sired and raised," implies the
children were beyond the age of newborns.3 2 In Quilloin, the child was
approximately twelve years old when Walcott sought adoption.'33
Caban's children were ages six and four when a petition for adoption
was filed by Caban.'34 The child in Lehr was more than two years old
when the Robertsons sought to adopt her.'35 Additionally, the Court in
Caban stated that "because the question is not before us, we express no
view whether such difficulties would justify a statute addressed
,,116
particularly to newborn adoptions.
Further, commentary on these
cases has pointed out that the Court has left unanswered the question of
the father's rights in the adoption of newborn children.'37
A.

State Courts' Discussion of Questions Concerning Fathers' Rights
Which Are Left Unanswered by the Supreme Court

Although the Supreme Court has failed to address these issues, state
courts have attempted to answer these concerns. Cases have arisen in
state courts involving newborns and mothers who hide their pregnancy
129. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
130. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-84; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
131. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-53.
132. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 65 1.
133. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
134. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-83.
135. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250, 252.
136. Caban 441 U.S. at 392 n. 11;see also HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL
174 (2d ed. 1986) ("The question that is most important to the effective functioning of the typical
adoption process, has not been answered: [none] of the earlier cases articulates the interested and
responsible unmarried father's rights immediately after the child's birth.").
137.

See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

20.2, at 861 (2d ed. 1988).
The Lehr case also leaves unanswered the question of the father's rights respecting
adoption placements of newborn children. In such cases he usually will have had no
opportunity to develop a relationship with the child if the mother relinquishes the child
straight from the hospital to an adoption agency, the procedure favored for non-relative
adoptions by many agencies.
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from the father. In these situations, the fact that the father has not
established a relationship with his child is due to the mother's actions,
not any inaction on his part. Many state courts have found that the father
would be entitled to notice of the adoption of the child because it was
the mother's bad deeds, not the father's inaction, that deprived the father
of the opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship.'3 ' The safe
haven laws present issues similar to the ones which the state courts have
been presented with.
In many cases, the courts have held that interference with an unwed
father's efforts to show a commitment to parenting his child provides
just cause for not stripping away his rights to contest an adoption of his
child. 39 In 1978, a Kansas court in In re Adoption of Lathrop'40 ruled that
an unwed father who has been prevented from providing parental care
for his child from the time of birth by outside agencies, such as adoptive
parents, cannot be faulted nor can his parental rights be lessened by his
failure to perform his parental responsibilities.14' In this case, the unwed
father was not originally notified of the filing of the petition for adoption
nor was his consent to the adoption obtained.4 4 The court acknowledged
that only the baby's mother needs to give her consent to the adoption of
a child. 43 If the father, after learning of the adoption, appears and asserts
his rights and desire to assume parental responsibility for the child, then
his rights must be given preference over the adoptive parents.'"4
However, it should be mentioned that the court restricted this ruling to
fathers who had failed to assume responsibility 145
of their child for less
than two years and fathers who are found to be fit.
The court in Ex rel. Baby Girl W.' 46 held that an unwed father's
parental rights could not be subject to termination prior to the time he
was contacted with a request that he relinquish his parental rights.' 47 This
138. See, e.g., In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182; B.G.C., 496 N.w.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992);
Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994); see also In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 333
(III. 1995) (awarding writ of habeas corpus and noting that unwed fathers who "through deceit, are
kept from assuming responsibility for and developing a relationship with their children, are entitled
to the same due process rights as fathers who actually are given an opportunity and do develop this
relationship").
139. See Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of
His Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R. 151, 179 (5th ed. 2001).
140. 575 P.2d 894 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
141. See Campbell, supra note 139, at 248.
142. See id.
143. See Lathrop, 575 P.2d at 898.
144. See id. at 898-99.
145. See id. at 899.
146. 728 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See id. at 548.
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applies if a father has no knowledge of the mother's location during the
prenatal period, if he was not informed the child was born, if the mother
acted to conceal the child's birth and the father's identity, and if there is
no evidence
to suggest that the father had any means of learning those
48
facts.1
In In re Adoption of Ashley, 149 the child's mother moved several
times and at no time advised the unwed father where the child was
located. ° The court determined that there was no showing of purposeful
ridding of parental obligations or withholding of interest, presence,
affection, care and support, and held that the unwed father's consent to
the adoption of his child was therefore required.''
Courts have also considered whether an unwed mother should be
permitted to be the sole authority on cases where she refuses to reveal
the identity of the father. 5 2 In Augusta County Department of Social
Services v. Unnamed Mother,'53 the court held that an agreement
surrendering a child for adoption is invalid without notice, at least by
publication, to the father when the mother knows the identity of the
natural father. The court reasoned that the statute recognized that an
unmarried natural father has parental rights that are protected by
procedural due process. 114 When a mother knows but refuses to reveal
the identity of the father, his rights attach to the child and cannot be
terminated without due process notice."'
In the cases of Baby Richard 5 ' and Baby Jessica,'

the state

supreme courts of Illinois and Iowa, respectively, regarded fathers as
blameless victims and held that the Constitution would not permit these
men to suffer the loss of fatherhood when they had done nothing to
warrant such a penalty. In the Baby Richard case, the Illinois Supreme
Court decided that the biological mother had schemed with the couple
who adopted Baby Richard in order to deprive the biological father of

See id.
562 N.Y.S.2d 338 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990).
See id. at 338.
See id. at 339.
See Campbell, supra note 139, at 301.
348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
See Campbell, supra note 139, at 301 (quoting the Virginia statute section 63.1-204(D):
reasonable under the circumstances ... taking into account the relative interests of the
child, the mother, and the father").
155. See id.
156. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 326 (I11.1995).
157. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1993).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
"what is
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any chance to obtain custody.' 8 The court ruled that the adoption of
Baby Richard be vacated. 5 9 When the court heard the case on petition,
they justified the result by pointing to the United States Constitution.
Although Kirchner did not have a substantial relationship with his son,
he had not dodged the responsibilities either.' 60 Concluding that the case
fell in between these circumstances, the court reasoned that the rationale
underlying Supreme Court decisions dealing with the rights of unwed
fathers "suggests that fathers . .. whose parental rights are not properly
terminated and who, through deceit, are kept from assuming
responsibility for and developing a relationship with their children, are
entitled to the same due process as fathers who
actually are given an
6
opportunity and do develop this relationship."1 '
The courts of Iowa and Michigan arrived at the same conclusion in
the Baby Jessica case. In this case the courts ordered Baby Jessica to be
taken from her adoptive parents' home in Michigan and returned to her
biological father.' 62 The Iowa court invoked authority from the
Constitution in coming to the conclusion that the adoption could not
continue without the father's consent or showing that he is unfit.'63 The
court asserted that an unwed father has a constitutionally protected
interest in establishing a relationship with a child when they were
prevented from having a relationship in the past.'"
Thus, based on these state court cases, a father has a due process
right to notice of any proceedings to terminate his parental rights. A
father has these rights, even if they have not offered support to the
mother or established a relationship with the child, when his inaction
was not his fault.

158. See Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 327. When Kirchner returned from a visit to Czechoslovakia
he was informed from the biological mother's relatives that the baby had died after childbirth. See
id. The mother then hid herself and the child from Kirchner's persistent inquiries. See id. When the
child was fifty-seven days old, the mother confessed that she had surrendered the child for adoption.
See id.
159. See In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (II1.1994).
160. See Kirchner,649 N.E.2d at 336.
161. Id. at 333; see also Doe, 638 N.E.2d at'
186 (McMorrow, J., concurring) (concluding that
Kirchner's behavior would not provide sufficient grounds for involuntarily terminating his parental
rights and therefore the adoption could not proceed without his consent).
162. See B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241. The mother named another man the father on Baby
Jessica's birth certificate and with that man surrendered the child for adoption. See id.
163. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 664 (Mich. 1993).
164. See id.
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B. State Courts' Treatment of Cases that Have Arisenfrom the Safe
Haven Laws
The Family Court of New York and circuit courts of Michigan and
Florida have all heard cases in which social service agencies have
requested a termination of parental rights of a baby who was surrendered
under the Safe Haven Laws. In the New York case, a baby was
abandoned and left at a hospital. 65' The Department of Social Services
was seeking an order to terminate parental rights and place the baby in
their guardianship and custody.'" Regarding notice to the parents, the
court stated that since "the identity and whereabouts of the mother were
unknown, and with absolutely no specific information about the putative
father of the child, notice of the proceeding was given via publication to
'Jane Doe."",167 However, this notice was primarily aimed at the mother,
Jane Doe, and therefore the father's parental rights were not addressed.'68
Ultimately, the court terminated the parental rights and granted custody
and guardianship to the Department of Social Services based on the facts
that the parents had abandoned their baby and failed to contact the child
during the six months after the termination proceedings were
instituted. 69 However, when addressing the factual basis for this
determination, the court only discussed the mother and made no mention
of the father at all.' 70

The Michigan court discussed the rights of biological parents and
Judge Brennan stated that "when the state takes action, or provides a
method by which, to terminate parental rights, the Constitution requires
fundamentally fair procedures."' 7 ' In that case, the court decided not to
terminate the parental rights of the father since the emergency service
provider failed to comply with provisions intended to protect nonsurrendering parents' rights.' 72 In another Michigan case, the court found
165. See In re Guardianship of Doe, 189 Misc. 2d 512, 513 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 514.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 515. The court stated that the:
[Mlother placed her newborn child at a designated safe haven site and has failed to
contact the child or agency during the six-month period after termination proceedings
were instituted. The mother has never paid child support, visited the child or in any way
contributed to the welfare of the child during this six-month period.
Id.
171. In re Anonymous, Michigan Court Case 8, 5 (Mich. Ct. Cl. 2001) (unpublished and
redacted opinion and order by Brennan, J.) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
172. See id. at 6, 7. The court stated that
the emergency service provider failed to make any 'reasonable effort' to provide the
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that the mother had concealed her pregnancy and the birth of the child
from the father. 7 3 Therefore, the court was not persuaded that the father
care and
had sufficient notice of a potential obligation to provide proper
74
custody to the child in order to terminate his parental rights.
Finally, in a Florida case, a woman anonymously abandoned her
baby at a Florida medical center. 75 The Department of Child and Family
Services requested a hearing to terminate the parental rights of the
baby. 6 Judge Doyel contended that the Department of Children and
Families has a constitutional due process requirement not only to find
the infant's mother, but also the father who may not have realized that
the baby's mother was pregnant. 77 Judge Doyel appointed a lawyer to
act on the father's behalf and ordered a more diligent search for the
biological parents.'7 8 Problems and delay with this case arose because the
Safe Baby Act does not explicitly dictate what to do in these cases. A
specific statute which was buried in the adoption law addresses a
father's right. This statute required published notice of the abandonment
which should include all identifying information. 7 9
V.

How SAFE HAVEN LAWS ADDRESS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
CONCERNS

Rights of parents regarding their children have been implied
through the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 80 However, the Supreme Court has failed to address the
rights of fathers with regard to their newborn babies who have been put
mother with any of the written and/or oral notifications that the surrender of the
newborn, absent certain action on her part, would result in the termination of the
mother's parental rights upon the expiration of the twenty eight (28) days.
Id.
173. In re Anonymous, Michigan Court Case 9, 8 (Mich. Ct. Cl. 2002) (unpublished and
redacted opinion and order by Brennan, J.) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
174. See id. at 2 n.5, 8; In re Anonymous, Michigan Court Case 8,5 (Mich. Ct. Cl. 2001).
Ultimately the court did terminate the father's parental rights but they relied upon the father's recent
incarceration for a significant period time. They terminated his rights under a different Michigan
statute,
MICH. CoMP. LAws 712A § 19b(3)(h) (2002). See id.
175. See Polkonline.com, Why Court Seeks Concerned Mother of Abandoned Baby (Jan. 19,
2003), at http://www.polkonline.com/ns-search/stories/011903/optabandoned.shtml (last visited
Apr. 2, 2003).
176. See Steven N. Levine, Concerns Increase for 'Baby Doe' Mother, (Jan. 18, 2003), at
http://www.polkonline.com/stories/01 1803/loc_baby.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Ana L. Partida, The Casefor "Safe Haven" Laws: Choosing the Lesser of Two Evils
in a Disposable Society, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 61, 78 (2002).
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up for adoption without their knowledge or consent.'8 ' The safe haven
laws impact the rights of fathers who fall into this category. State courts
have attempted to answer these questions and many have embraced the
view that the Constitution protects not only existing parent-child
relationships, but also a parent's "opportunity interest" in establishing
such a relationship. 182 Thus, in order for safe haven laws to comply with
the minimum procedural due process standards,, notice and an
opportunity to be heard must be provided to fathers.'83 This standard
obliges the state to make diligent efforts to locate the father of an
abandoned infant before moving to terminate his parental rights. 8 4 Safe
haven laws raise concerns that the mother's anonymity endangers or
eliminates the rights of fathers who may not know that they have
children. 5
A.

Safe Haven Law Notice to FatherProvisions

Of the forty-two states that have safe haven legislation, only twelve
comply with the due process requirements and include procedures to
safeguard fathers' rights.' 6 The other thirty states do not provide for any
search and/or notice to be given to the father.' 87 The forty-two states with
safe haven legislation can be split into three categories. The first
category consists of states that meet the due process requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard. These are the states that provide for
notice by publication or through the media. The second category of
states includes those which require a search of the putative father

181. For a discussion on this topic, see supra Part II.E.
182. See Meyer, supra note 108, at 768-69; see also Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1162-63
(D.C. App. 1990); Smith v. Malouf, 722 So.2d 490, 497 (Miss. 1998); In re Raquel Marie X., 559
N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990); In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 91 (S.D. 1996); Nale v.
Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994); Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 747-50 (W. Va.
1998).
183. See id.; see also Nina Williams-Mbengue, Safe Havens for Abandoned Infants, 26 NCSL
STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1,5 (2001).
184. See Dailard, Cynthia, The Drive to Enact 'Infant Abandonment' Laws-A Rush to
Judgment?, 3 GUT'MACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 1, 3 (2000).
185. See
The
Nature
of
Baby
Abandonment,
at
http://www.cwla.org/programs/baby/babymonograph.pdf [hereinafter Baby Abandonment].
186. Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, South
Carolina, Tennessee and Utah. See EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES: 'SAFE HAVEN' LAWS ARE CAUSING PROBLEMS, NOT SOLVING THEM 6, 12 n.49
(2003), at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/whowe/Last%20report.pdf [hereinafter UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES].

187.

See id.
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registry 8 and provide that notice should be sent to any potential father
who has registered. This second category most likely meets the
minimum due process requirements; however, there are problems
regarding substantive procedures of these statutes. Finally, a third
category of safe haven laws are silent about providing notice to fathers.
These statutes are unconstitutional and violate the procedural due
process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first category of states meet the due process requirements by
providing constructive notice.'" Constructive notice is given via
publication in widely circulated newspapers.'9 ° The publication contains
information that a baby has been abandoned, any identifying information
about the baby, and information about how to assert a claim of parental
rights.' 9' Delaware, for example, requires publishing notice in a
statewide newspaper
at least 3 times over a 3-week period immediately following the
surrender of the baby unless the Division has relinquished custody.
The notice, at a minimum, shall contain the place, date and time where
the baby was surrendered, the baby's sex, race, approximate age,
identifying marks, [and] any other information the Division deems
necessary for the baby's identification.'92
Other state statutes which require notice by publication resemble that of
Delaware.' 93 In addition to requiring publication by notice, some states,
188. The putative father registry requires a man who believes he may have fathered a child out
of wedlock to file notice with the appropriate state agency. Notice of any adoption proceeding is
then provided to any registrant. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031, 1039 (2002).
189. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 432B.520(4)(c) (Michie 2002);. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85 (Law. Co-op. 2002).
190. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(3)(E).
191. See Baby Abandonment, supra note 185, at 15.
192. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907A(h) (Supp. 2002).
193. These states include Florida, Michigan, Nevada and South Carolina.
Within 7 days after accepting physical custody of the newborn infant, the licensed childplacing agency shall initiate a diligent search to notify and to obtain consent from a
parent whose identity or location is unknown, other than the parent who has left a
newborn infant at a hospital, emergency medical services station, or fire station in
accordance with s. 383.50 .... Constructive notice must also be provided pursuant to
chapter 49 in the county where the newborn infant was left and in the county where the
petition to terminate parental rights will be filed. The constructive notice must include at
a minimum, available identifying information, and information on whom a parent must
contact in order to assert a claim of parental rights of the newborn infant and how to
assert that claim.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4).
Within 28 days, make reasonable efforts to identify and locate a parent who did not
surrender the newborn. If the identity and address of that parent are unknown, the child
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such as Florida, require that a diligent search be conducted for the
child's father.'94 Florida does this by providing inquires of all known
relatives, offices, or programs that may have information and all other
state and federal agencies that would be likely to have any
information. 95
It is possible that constructive notice will not reach the unknown
father; however, an actual notice requirement would be impossible to
meet. 196 If the court were to require actual notice, the process of adoption
for the abandoned newborn would be seriously impaired.' 97 Actual notice
may never be achieved and this would mean the child would never be
eligible for adoption because the requirements to terminate parental
rights would not be met.
The middle category of statutes appear to meet the minimum due
process requirements. This category includes eight states that require

placing agency shall provide notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in the county where the newborn was surrendered.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 712.7(f) (West 2002).

Child was delivered to a provider of emergency services pursuant to NRS 432B.630 and
the location of the parent is unknown, the summons must be served on the parent by
publication at least once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in the
county and if no such newspaper is published, then a newspaper published in this state
that has a general circulation in the county.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.520(4)(c) (Michie 2002).
Within forty-eight hours after taking legal custody of the infant, the department must
publish notice, in a newspaper of general circulation in the area where the hospital or
hospital outpatient facility that took the infant is located, and send a news release to
broadcast and print media in the area. The notice and the news release must state the
circumstances under which the infant was left at the hospital or hospital outpatient
facility, a description of the infant, and the date, time, and place of the permanency
planning hearing provided for in subsection (E)(2). The notice and the news release must
also state that any person wishing to assert parental rights in regard to the infant must do
so at the hearing. If the person leaving the infant identified anyone as being a parent of
the infant, the notice must be sent by certified mail to the last known address of the
person identified as a parent at least two weeks prior to the hearing.
S.C. CODE ANN § 20-7-85(E)(1).
194. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4):
The diligent search must include, at a minimum, inquiries of all known relatives of the
parent, inquiries of all offices or program areas of the department likely to have
information about the parent, inquiries of other state and federal agencies likely to have
information about the parent, inquiries of appropriate utility and postal providers, and
inquiries of appropriate law enforcement agencies.
Id.
195. See id.
196. See Partida, supra note 180, at 78-79.
197. See id.
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only a search of the state's putative father registry. 98 If any men on the
registry could be the infant's father, the state must notify them of
proceedings that terminate their parental rights.' 99
Putative father registries have generated a great deal of criticism.
Critics argue that few men are aware of the registries or the need to
register to protect their rights, women may conceal their pregnancy or
misrepresent the situation, and filing with the registry in one state does
not guarantee notice of an adoption in other state. 2" An examination of
the substantive procedures which the putative father registry entails
shows that the putative father registry is not the best means of providing
a potential father with notice.
The putative father registry requires that a father provide the
following information in regards to himself: his name, address, social
security number and date of birth.2"" The father is also asked to provide
the following other information relating to the mother: her name, last
address, social security number, and date of birth.02 Additionally, he is
asked the name, gender, place of birth and date of birth or anticipated
date of birth of the child.0 3 This information may be helpful if one
knows the identity of the mother or the child. However, due to the
anonymity requirement of safe haven laws, authorities required to search
the putative registry will not have any information regarding the mother,
father, and possibly even the baby. The authorities will not know the
name of the baby, or with any degree of certainty the baby's date of
birth. Due to these factors, it is unlikely that the identity of the father
will ever be ascertained.2°
Furthermore, a search of the putative father registry is limited to
those who have registered with it. It is possible that a father could have
lived with the mother and supported her during her pregnancy or
possibly even lived with the child and established an emotional bond
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0423(4); IDAHO CODE § 39-8206 (Michie 2002); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 2/50(h)(1) (West 2003); IOWA CODE § 233.2 (2003); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.950(6) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-411 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-255(a)(c)
(2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-802(5)(c) (2003).
199. See Baby Abandonment, supra note 185, at 14.
200. See Beck, supra note 188, at 1049.
201.

See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1; IOWA CODE

§ 144.12A;

TENN. CODE ANN.,

§ 36-2-318.
202. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/12.1; IOWA CODE § 144.12A; TENN. CODE ANN.,
§ 36-2-318; see also Beck, supra note 188, at 1039.
203. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/i2.1; IOWA CODE § 144.12A; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 710.33 (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-3 18.
204. See Karin Dwelle, Adoption Without Consent: How Idaho is Treading on the
Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 207, 233 (2002).
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with the baby and still be denied all rights regarding the infant if he has
not filed with the registry.0 5 Therefore, "unless you have information
concerning the identity of the other parent gathered at the time an infant
is abandoned, the prospects for a successful adoption of the child may be
fatally compromised." 2' 6
The majority of states with safe haven legislation fall within the
third category of statutes: those which do not explicitly address
providing fathers with notice." Some states "follow existing child
welfare statutes providing that abandonment constitutes a waiver of
parental rights."20 8 These child welfare statutes do not provide for any
notice to be given to a father.2' 9 Others do not specifically address
termination of parental rights, even by referencing existing law, in their
safe haven statutes.20 Therefore these provisions violate due process.
First, it is not clear whether a parent can abandon a child prior to
the birth of the child in a manner sufficient to excuse the court from
205. See id. at 235.
206. State of Tenn. Proposed Legislation Regarding Infant Abandonment, Op. Att'y Gen. No.
01-035 (Mar. 12, 2001).
207. See UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 186, at 6. Examples of these states are:
California, Connecticut, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota and West Virginia. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 6. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7(d) (West 2003); CONN.
GEN. STAT ANN. § 17A-59 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-3 (Michie 2003); LA.
CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 1704(C) (West Supp. 2002) (describing that that the department of
social services shall file and pursue a petition to terminate parental rights and relinquishment may
be grounds for such termination); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.6 to 30:4C-15.9 (West Supp. 2002)
(stating a petition to terminate parental rights can be initiated on the ground that the parent has
abandoned the child and that authorities are not required to search for relatives as a placement
option); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B- I1 (a)(7) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3519 (Anderson
2002) (stating that notice is only required to be given if the court has knowledge of the names of the
parents); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.017(5)(b) (2001) (determining that a child is deemed to be
abandoned for all legal purposes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13.1-5 (2002) (requiring a commencement
of proceedings to terminate parental rights in accordance with existing law provided no person has
asserted a claim to be the parent within 90 days, however, there is no mention of notice to potential
parents. Further, leaving a child at the safe havens prima facie evidence of permanent
abandonment); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5A-29 (Michie 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-5
(Michie 2002) (stating that the child shall be deemed an abandoned child and be eligible for
adoption as an abandoned child); Wis. STAT. § 48.195 (2002) (requiring that the court can grant
involuntary termination of parental rights on the grounds that custody has been relinquished with no
need to provide notice).
210. See UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES, supra note 186, at 12 n.48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 2625-2 (2003); ARI. REV. STAT. § 13-3623.01 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-34-201 to 9-34-204
(Michie 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-1OA-6 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 5-641
(2002); MINN. STAT. § 260C.217 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-203 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-22-5 (2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-g (McKinney 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7115.1
(2003), and WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.360 (2003).
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requiring that parent's consent to the adoption proceeding. 2' ' For
example, someone may not have a stable relationship with the mother of
the child or may provide little support during the pregnancy. However, it
is possible that the father could develop a relationship with the child
after the child's birth. Therefore, it would not be fair to treat the father as
though he has abandoned his child before the birth.
Second, not only do these statutes take away the rights of the father
who has no idea that he has even fathered a child, but they also deprive
rights to fathers who may have taken affirmative steps towards
parenting. For example, one can imagine a scenario where a father wants
to play an active role in his child's life. He may have provided support to
the mother during pregnancy, but the mother did not want to marry the
father or want his help. The mother then leaves the child at a safe haven
without telling anyone. Under legislation following only child welfare
statutes, this father would not receive notice that his baby had been
abandoned or that his parental rights were going to be terminated.
Another scenario envisions a father who has registered with the putative
father registry who does not receive notice of the termination of his
parental rights because the safe haven statutes do not require a search of
the registry.2 2 This category of statutes, which inadequately protects the
rights of the father, can hinder the goals of adoption proceedings by
allowing a father to interfere with the process once it has already begun
(or even after an adoption has been completed) in order to fight for his
custody rights. 2 3
B. Solutions on How to Make Safe Haven Laws Constitutional
In order to protect due process rights, many of the safe haven
statutes should be amended to provide for notification to fathers. The
statutes should include provisions such as those contained within South
Carolina's legislation requiring publication of the abandoned baby. This
statute requires that a news release be sent to television and radio
broadcast and print media in the area with all known information about
the infant and the circumstances surrounding the abandonment.
Immediate publicity of the abandonment coupled with a search of the

211.
212.
registry,
(1983).
213.

See Raum & Skaare, supra note 9, at 546.
The Court in Lehr v. Robertson noted that by simply registering with the putative father
Lehr would have been entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings. See 463 U.S. 248, 264
See Partida, supra note 180, at 79.
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putative father registry should be performed wherein notice is provided
to all possible fathers.
A second feature that all states should mandate is a provision to
help determine paternity of the child. New Hampshire is considering
establishing a registry to help fathers who think that their children may
have been abandoned.2 4 These fathers can submit DNA samples to the
Department of Health and after a newborn is abandoned the database
would be checked to see if there is a match. 25 Although, this suggestion
would only benefit a father who was aware of the pregnancy, it is a
stronger way to ensure that due process is preserved.
Furthermore, all safe haven laws should include provisions asking
the mother to give some information so that the father can be identified.
While it may be argued that to require the mother to provide this
information would undermine the purpose of the statute, it does not
undermine it to simply ask for it. A mother may be so emotional or
distraught about abandoning her child that she is not thinking about
providing the safe haven with any information even though she does not
mind giving some details. Even if the mother does not provide details
about the father, any facts that the mother provides can be helpful and
can be used in the notice and publication of the abandonment.
The impact of these statutes upon the father is enormous. If he
learns of a child's existence after the abandonment or even worse, after
the adoption, he is left knowing that there is a child somewhere, whom
he is the father of but may never see. The impact on the father is
immeasurable. Additionally, the impact on children of knowing that
somewhere they have a biological father who abandoned them when in
fact their biological father would have loved to raise them should be
avoided.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rights of unwed fathers have come a long way over the years.
However, safe haven statutes prevent fathers from achieving a status that
they are constitutionally entitled to. This Note has examined Supreme
Court cases which give unwed fathers rights in relation to their children;
however, the father's rights in the context of newborns has been left
unanswered by the Supreme Court. Additionally, this Note has discussed
214. See Colin Manning, Senate OKs 'Safe Haven' Bill Protecting Newborns, Foster's Daily
Democrat, Mar. 28, 2003 at http://premiuml.fosters.con2003/news/mar.03/mar_28/news/reg_coO
328a.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
215. See id. This would be at the expense of the father. See id.
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the attempt by many state courts to resolve the issues of father's rights in
this context. It appears that it would be consistent with these decisions to
conclude that fathers have a right to be notified about the existence of
their newborn child and that a father's consent is necessary in order to
terminate his parental rights. Based on these findings, a fair conclusion
is that many of the safe haven statutes violate this constitutional right
which fathers are entitled to. Therefore, despite all the benefits of the
statutes, they must be changed in order to provide for the constitutional
rights of fathers in relation to the custody, care, and control of their
children.
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